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The Contribution of the Euro-dollar Market to the Modern Financial World
The Euro-dollar market* had caused many changes to the modern financial world in which, the open competitive effect of the international money market caused the liberalization by almost all industrialized countries of domestic money and banking markets. The market acted as a fully international mechanism for attracting deposits and offering loans, over a broad range of maturities and at highly competitive rates. The first important development of Euro-dollar business came after the Second World War, when Soviet bloc holders of dollar balances wanted to keep them in a form not subject to control by the US authorities. They kept them with London banks. However, the development of the market as a large-scale international structure really dates from 1957. It was given its impetus then by a rise in UK Bank rate to 7% and the imposition of restrictions on sterling credits to finance trade between non-sterling countries. At that time, banks in the US were limited (by Regulation Q) as to the amount of interest they might pay on deposits. Banks outside the US were able to offer a higher rate for dollar deposits, and yet, by operating on finer margins, to offer competitive terms for dollar loans. Many banks were well placed to take advantage of this situation. This was because of their wide overseas connections, long experience of international business and variety of outlets for making international loans. The first substantial development of the market took place in London, and London conducted much of the largest share of the business, which contributed considerable invisible earnings to the UK balance of payments.
The role of sterling has been a central point to the development of the Euro-dollar market. To the sense that, the control of sterling has not only been a central preoccupation of British governments, but largely determined Britain’s strategy towards the international financial market. Since 1958, governments have found themselves in a “dilemma” by the pressures of which the international use of sterling had placed on the British economy where “depleted” reserves of the entire sterling area constituted the most significant constraint on achieving economic growth. The management of sterling was the heart of governing Britain until conditions allowed the convertibility of the currency in the late 1950s. The central point that, throughout the postwar period, the British government sought agreements that enabled US dollars to flow to Britain whilst restricting the convertibility of sterling in domestic and foreign hands, (the Washington Loan Agreement, the Marshall Plan, and military assistance programmes encouraged a flow of dollars to Britain).
The UK government placed particular emphasis on exports to the dollar area (dollar-earning exports), with sterling area exports deemed next in importance. As early as the 1950s, Conservative governments, set about reasserting the international status of sterling and the importance of the City of London as the world’s premier financial centre. In 1953, commodity markets and exchanges for raw materials were re-opened in London. March 1954 saw the long awaited return of London Gold Market (open to all non-residents of the sterling area). Changes were made in currency regulations in 1955, which allowed the partial convertability of the pound for non-sterling area residents and non-dollar area residents. This was followed finally by the full convertability of sterling in December 1958, and by the Bank of England’s decision in 1962 to provide cheap foreign exchange cover and allow non-residents to hold dollar balances with the Bank of England (thus signalling the beginning of the Euro-dollar market). Dollars could now be deposited with the Bank of England in an external account, thereby escaping US exchange regulations and earning a higher rate of interest than obtainable in the US. The aim here was well calculated. London’s position as the main financial centre would be re-established and the City would quickly become the world’s leading Euro-dollar market.
However, the real significance of the Euro-dollar market lay in the fact that it originally drew its funds from non-bank suppliers and ultimately lent them to non-bank users, in which the established market was not dependent upon the existence on the USA remaining in deficit. As, the market soon become an integrated international money market providing its own specialised service which had shown considerable powers of survival. Merchant banks simply turned to the expatriate dollars, and used them in the way they have used sterling, operating freely on a global scale in the financing of international trade and the arrangement of longer term loans. American and other foreign banks wanting to take advantage of the paucity of financial controls in the UK soon joined this new market that was dominated by the merchant banks. Hence, between 1967-1978 the representation of foreign banks in London grew from 113 to 395. As, for the City’s banks, the establishment of sterling convertability in 1958 “was arguably the most important event of this century”, for it heralded the rise of the London Euro-dollar market. The table below shows how dramatic the Euro-dollar market had indeed become. A total of 91 international Euro-currency issues totalling the equivalent of $1,884m took place in 1967. The firms shown below are ranked in order of the aggregate amount of issues for which they acted either as managers or as co-managers. Apart from those listed, there were 45 firms active in such management .
Euro-dollar Bond League
Firm - Total Dollar Equivalents (000)- Number of Issues:
Banque de Paris et des Pays-Bas - 490,000 - 21
Banca Commerciale Italiana - 445,000 - 19
S.G. Warburg & Co - 385,700 - 21
Deutsche Bank A.G. - 367,500 - 17
Kuhn, Loeb & Co - 295,000 - 15
White Weld &Co - 285,200 - 14
Lazard Freres & Co - 265,000 - 14
N.M. Rothschild & Sons - 260,000 - 11
Morgan & Cie International S.A. - 260,000 - 8
Lehman Brothers - 250,000 - 9
Banca Nazionale del Lavoro - 194,000 - 9
First Boston Corporation - 168,000 - 8
Banque Nationale de Paris - 152,500 - 6
Societe Generale de Banque - 135,000 - 7
Amsterdam-Rotterdam Bank N.V. - 135,000 - 6
Credit Commercial de France - 131,200 - 7
Kredietbank - 130,200 - 9
Smith, Barney & Co Inc. - 130,000 - 8
Societe Generale - 125,000 - 5
Credit Lyonnais - 122,200 - 5
(Source: The Times, the Euro-dollar bond league 29 December 1967)
The City of London proved to be a highly successful international commercial banking and financial centre, despite growing fears of competition from other centres. It presented strength, derived largely from the generalised “trust” with which the world views the City. The survival and revival of London as an international financial centre after the disruptions of the Second World War and the weakness of sterling as an international reserve currency had been largely based upon the development of the Euro-currency markets. In specific the growth of new or “parallel” markets alongside the old “classic” discount market, which with the relative decline of sterling as an international currency, had become a domestic concern. These new markets had revitalised the foreign exchange markets in response to the emergence of barriers of various kinds between ultimate borrowers and lenders. On the one hand, the domestic parallel money market in sterling evolved out of responses which were intended to evade the credit restrictions which successive British governments had attempted to impose during the 1960s through their participation in the old discount market. On the other hand, the decline of sterling and the difficulties associated with the US governments’ restrictions on the use of the dollar as an international currency gave rise to new markets in Euro-dollars and other Euro-currencies. New money markets where money is lent and borrowed between banks, companies and other organisations without the control of the monetary authorities (governments and central banks). It was a measure of the City’s autonomy that such developments took place.
The development of the Euro-dollar Market can be described by using a Marxist analysis of capitalism, in particular, the workings of the capitalist economy and its political and social implications. In specific, to the theory of the state in advanced capitalism, and on the basis of the materialist conception of history and Marx’s general theory of capitalist production. As any attempt to develop a theory of the state, must deal with a Marx’s works on the state. In the sense that, capitalism is analysed predominantly as “civil society”, as a more or less self-contained sphere in which all citizens, including capitalists and workers, confront each other as competing individuals on the market. Using this conception, the state occupies another sphere standing outside civil society, which purports to represent universality or the community between people, but is constantly undermined by the antagonistic individualism of its basis, namely civil society.
Karl Marx claimed that, “the abstraction of the state as such belongs only to modern times. The abstraction of the political state is a modern product” . The Euro-dollar market inherently being a new phenomenon proved some uncertainty to the British Labour government during the mid-1960s, which had to approach the new market through an analysis of the world in which the Labour Party sought to govern. Such an analysis posed a variety of questions. Firstly, why particular institutions and processes posed such a set of problems for the individual Labour governments? Secondly, why particular issues come to preoccupy political debate in one period only for it to dwindle in importance in the next? Finally, why particular patterns of political and social cleavage prove so tenacious? With such questions, and a new market developing, the British Labour Government had to respond with a set agenda in order to control specified targets including the sequence of booms and slumps, the differing strengths of the national economy, the rise and significance of multinational corporations, the role of international financial agencies, and the changing role of the government in economic and social life. Such a task seems a formidable one, but one that was not considered impossible. As what holds the analysis together is the recognition that the world during the 1960s was capitalist to the sense that Marx used the term. The law of value still operated throughout the major economic and social processes. Due to this reason, the preceding outline of Marx’s analysis remains relevant, as it provides the means by which the true nature of the British government’s dilemmas can be explained and understood.
To Marx, the executive of the modern state is portrayed as “a committee for managing the common affairs of the whole bourgeoisie”. However, there is a problem, which must confront any contemporary theory of Marxism, namely the relation between appearance and reality. The state appears as independent from the sphere of market exchange, but in reality it is a different matter. The Euro-dollar is an example of such a case, in essence a phenomenon of the 1960s, an international money market where commercial banks undertook wholesale transactions involving foreign currencies. It had been a growing market, which has often involved conflicts with the state. As governments change, the market had been growing at a rapid pace, which had proved to be difficult to regulate. It seems that the Euro-dollar market was one of the initiating processes, which led to what is known today as globalization. To the sense that, the market had caused many changes to the modern financial world which, evolved on a global scale. The open competitive effect of the international money market had caused the liberalization by almost all industrialized countries of domestic money and banking markets. Where, successful participants in the money market of today, have a far more sophisticated understanding of financial risk, and the tools to manage them. As the changes in the markets have required many banking institutions to change in the way of financial regulation.
However, when examining the Euro-dollar market, one has to turn to the 1960s which witnessed the focus of the changing relationship between the national state and the global financial markets, where the policies of Keynesian sought to bring “economic forces” under control. The idea was that the state should assume responsibility for the economy, intervening where the market fails to stimulate economic growth. In times of a recession, the state should stimulate demand through deficit financing (such as, state expenditure based on credit). The state was thus charged with creating demand through an increase of the money supply. Keynesian raised these means to the principle of capitalist reproduction. Governments used these methods in a form of expansionary policies. Keynesianism depended upon the use of money for expansive industrial development and the management of “sound” finance.
One major question arose, throughout the paper: what are the risks and problems of the Euro-dollar market, and is the growth of this market a “welcome tonic or a slow poison” to the international financial system (with particular emphasis to the United Kingdom)?
There was no doubt that the growth of the Euro-dollar market had contributed spectacularly to the easing of the world liquidity problem. In less than a decade, the market grew from nothing to $13,000 million compared with an increase in official world reserves of only $21,000 million from 1951 to 1965. However, the growth of this market merely “put-off” the evil day when the reserve currency countries, and in particular the United States, had to adjust their payment situations to the facts of life. On the technical level the growth in the Euro-dollar market exposed the world in general and Britain in particular to every similar dangers to those experienced in the early thirties. Of its nature it was a market notable for its lack of regulation and control. No one country could exercise control over it. Euro-dollar deposits were no longer used solely for trade finance, and hence were not self-cancelling. Although individual banks observed limits to the amount of dollars they were to lend to individual “names”, countries or areas, deposits passed through many hands before they had reached the final user. It was almost impossible to tell the extent to which any country or individuals were committed to repaying Euro-dollars. If a serious breakdown occurred anywhere in the system, the strain would be transmitted to the centre. Britain’s involvement in this market was so extensive with £2,773 million liabilities and £2,487 million credits, by 1968, that a breakdown would inevitably throw doubt on Sterling .
The risks and problems associated with the Euro-dollar market made themselves felt at three levels: the individual bank, the individual country, and at the level of the international financial system as a whole. For an individual bank the main risk was the possibility that a borrower may not repay his Euro-dollar loan. The borrower for any number of purposes – over which because of their unsecured nature, the lending bank had very little control, may use Euro-dollar funds. For an individual country, the problems created by the Euro-dollar market were two-fold: Firstly, the danger that the domestic banks involved in the market may over-extend themselves and thereby place demands on the official foreign exchange reserve. Secondly, the fact that the existence of the Euro-dollar market had provided another channel through which short-term capital can flow internationally and, hence, had tended to increase the volume of short-term capital moving into or out of any particular country”.
There were difficulties in establishing a mechanism that could bring about the necessary degree of international control over the Euro-dollar market. The most important was the fact that there was no single institution, either national or international, that could control the market, and act as an international lender of last resort in the same way that a national central bank can in the case of a national money market. There seemed to be a system of informal understanding among the central banks, developing probably as part of their co-operation in fighting exchange crisis, under which substantial volumes of US dollars could be mobilised quickly to meet any serious destabilising forces in the Euro-dollar market. In circumstances where the needs of the Euro-dollar market did conflict with other policy objectives, however, it was doubtful the national central banks would give priority to the Euro-dollar market. This was the basic weakness. As, in order to avoid this situation, the US dollar funds needed to stabilise the Euro-dollar market would have had to be made available on a more formal basis – such as by means of pre-arranged swap and stand by arrangements between the national central banks and the BIS. In this situation the BIS would be free to call on these swap funds in accordance with the needs of the Euro-dollar market. In addition, to meet these requirements during a period of crisis the volume of US funds at the disposal of the BIS would have had to be substantial. Undoubtedly, the major portion of these swap funds had to originate from the Federal Reserve System.
Generally, however as far as the international financial system was concerned, one heard nothing but good of the Euro-dollar market and of its rapid expansion. Whitehall had generally welcomed it as a means of financing the UK’s overseas mandate (investments) without putting undue strain on sterling. The City of London virtually created the market and had made a good deal of business out of it. The Chancellor of the Exchequer stated way back on the 8th December 1960, of using US dollars to improve the UK balance of payments, and to improve the UK dollar indebtedness. Throughout the end of the 1960s, it was apparent that the Euro-dollar market not only financed the UK economy, but assisted in the UK’s balance of payment’s problems. The British government foresaw the Euro-dollar Market as a way for advancing its own interests and concerns. The role of the public authorities and the nationalised industries proved to be very crucial to the UK government. These industries became a way for the UK government to raise foreign currency on a medium and long-term basis in order to finance its repayments of shorter-term debt and to improve the UK reserves. Both the Inland Revenue and the Treasury agreed on one thing that, something had to be done to “helping local authorities to obtain access to the Euro-dollar market” . To the sense that, both parties considered it desirable to include a provision in the Finance Bill of 1970 to the effect that “the interest on securities issued by a local authority in the currency of a country outside the scheduled territories shall be payable in full without deduction of tax at source, and be exempt from income tax where the beneficial owner of the securities is not resident in the UK”. This was the combined view of the Treasury and the Inland Revenue as a “means of removing an impediment to foreign currency borrowing by UK authorities in the Eurobond market” . The reason for this was that, “it was in the public interest for nationalised industries and large local authorities to borrow on the Euro-dollar market” .
Controls in the UK had been designed to protect the reserves by restricting access to the market by UK residents and restricting of “switching” out of sterling by banks in the UK. UK residents who were able to show a need were allowed to maintain foreign currency deposits (which earned Euro-dollar rates) with UK banks. These deposits soon accrued dramatically. Also control was permitting UK residents (especially the local authorities) to borrow foreign currencies in this market, or overseas where this allowed beneficial transactions to take place without recourse to the reserves (e.g. for foreign investment). Banks in the UK were allowed to maintain an excess of foreign currency claims over liabilities (i.e. to switch out of sterling) only to the extent necessary for them to maintain working balances.
This would accommodate a significant and useful benefit to the UK balance of payments. The idea was considered to be of such importance that large steps were taken to encourage UK borrowers to “tap” into the foreign currency sources of finance. The UK government passed powerful legislation through parliament, which involved serious sensitive issues such as tax measures encouraging foreign currency borrowing (i.e. tax allowances, tax evasion, and payment of gross interest), and double taxation agreements.
However, certain issues arose which showed the sensitivity of the situation of whether the UK government were favouring business interests, when pursuing its policies, and whether HM government would relieve these industries of the loss should-ever there be a change in the exchange rates (in a form of a Government Exchange Guarantee). The argument being that the government could not allow a nationalised industry to default and by encouraging the nationalised industries to borrow for the sole purpose of easing the balance of payments, the interest rates would be more than counter-balanced by the increased production that would be made possible. Given successful management of demand, such production would either find its way into exports or into the satisfaction of needs, which would otherwise be placed into imports. This meant that external sources of capital financed a large part of the UK’s portfolio and direct investment abroad, and UK borrowers were allowed under exchange control to raise foreign currency loans to finance domestic investment. This was implemented by providing an “off-shore” regulation-free environment devised to trade financial assets denominated in foreign currencies.
One situation concerned the Ford Motor Company in the USA. The company had entered into a contract to purchase for dollars, the sterling required to enable the company to undertake their offer to buy 45% shareholdings in the Ford Motor Company of the UK, which they did not already own. The UK Government on the 13th December 1960, received $370 million for value for this offer . Secondly, it was a market that even interested the IBRD. On 18th August 1960 Mr Miller of the IBRD’s Paris Office wrote to the UK Treasury, to discuss with the Bank of England, the question of whether the International bank could follow the example that was apparent, with many other institutions investing dollars in the UK at short term, and to place these into what was identified as the “Euro-Dollar Market”. At the end, the IBRD eventually dropped the idea of placing certain liquid dollar assets in London, because of the unfavourable attitude of the US Treasury. Although the IBRD decided not to process this further, it nevertheless resembled the importance and relevance of the Euro-dollar market, and of the City of London itself .
In 1968, the progress in reducing the UK balance of payments deficit was much slower than the UK Government had either anticipated or desired. As, the third quarter figures of 1968 experienced an unprecedented net inflow of nearly £200m on long-term capital account and a further reduction in the current account deficit. On the combined current and long-term capital accounts there was an identified surplus of around £105m: the best quarterly result since the fourth quarter of 1966, and following deficits of about £310m and £170m in the first and second quarters. Official long-term capital transactions benefited in the third quarter. There was a very large net inward movement of private long-term capital amounting to around £175m . However in 1969, there was a considerable turnaround between the first and second halves of the year, when the current and long-term capital deficit fell from £427m to £31m. Apart from the substantial progress in cutting the trade deficit, a significant part of the improvement resulted from changes on the capital account. The outflow on official capital (in the capital account) inevitably rose. Bond issues overseas by UK public corporations provided a counterbalance to the increase. Tighter credit in the UK tended to check outward movements and encouraged inward movements of long and short-term capital. As investment of this kind involved no call on the UK reserves, in the standard form of the balance of payments, the investment was recorded as a debit, but the Euro-dollars which financed it were recorded not as a credit, but as a monetary inflow. In general, it seemed that there had been an encouraging start towards the UK achieving its immediate objective for 1969-70, and that the outlook for achieving a larger continuing surplus thereafter was good .
However even though it is easy to view these events by their own logic, in order to understand their real significance, they must be set in the context of the negotiations which took place between Britain and Europe in the mid-1950s. In the summer and autumn of 1955, Britain was invited to discussions on closer European economic integration by the six nations, which eventually signed the Treaties of Rome in March 1957. After a flurry of activity in Whitehall, the Cabinet Office circulated the Trend Report, which pointed out to four decisive considerations against membership . Firstly, the Cabinet Office and the Treasury had concluded that membership would weaken the UK’s economic and consequently its political relationship with the Commonwealth and the colonies. Secondly, it was judged that the UK’s economic and political interests were worldwide and that a European common market would be contrary to the approach of freer trade and payments. Thirdly, it was thought that participation would gradually lead to political federation, which was unacceptable to Britain. Finally, the Cabinet Office concluded that membership would be detrimental to the British economy since it would involve the removal of protection for British industry against European competition. When placed alongside the earlier considerations relating to sterling, the Trend Report convinced the Eden government that Britain should withdraw from the Messina Talks. Instead of negotiating with the Six, Thornecroft at the Board of Trade convinced the Cabinet to launch an alternative non-discriminatory scheme aiming to “disunite” the Six away from the idea of the common market. This scheme, labelled Plan G, later developed into Britain’s free trade proposals, which became the basis of the European Free Trade Area (EFTA) established after the Stockholm Conference in 1959 . Whilst, Plan G proposed a free trade area designed to eliminate industrial tariffs, it carried no further implications regarding wider economic integration. Within a free trade area, Britain could retain its traditional trading structure, and as Board of Trade concluded, this would be entirely different from a European discriminatory bloc in which Britain came under domination of Germany.
The successful conclusion of the Treaty of Rome in March 1957, came as a major surprise to the British state. It was fundamental to British thinking that the Six would not go ahead without the participation of the UK. In a frank memorandum titled “What went wrong?”, the Treasury surveyed the scene in July 1959, and concluded that the government had made a number of serious errors . Britain had misunderstood the US position, not realising that the US State department would always back the Community given its political and defence implications. It had made a number of tactical errors, in trying to divide the Six, in believing that the UK would be allowed to join at any stage once the Community was formed and in failing to establish a “negotiating machinery” to match that of the French. Finally the British government had continued to pursue the half-hearted 17 nation EFTA strategy when it was clear that neither the French nor the Germans were attracted to the idea, which in any case the Treasury concluded “does not bear examination for five minutes”. The next 14 years would be spent struggling with the legacy of the British state’s failed attempt to prevent the creation of the Community.
A further examination must make reference to the form of Britain’s postwar integration into international trade and money markets. Although a number of events began to weaken Britain’s position in the global political economy (Suez and the relentless process of decolonisation), access to privileged markets had enabled the economy to reconstruct and prosper in the early 1950s. Moreover, the British governments could utilise the international prestige of sterling and the City of London to counter, (at least in theory), the effects of balance of payments deficits. Once it became clear that, de Gaulle would not sanction UK entry to the Community, Britain was caught in a bind and was forced to pin its economic hopes on the revival of the City of London.
In the 19th century, it was the competitiveness of “British industry” which led to the international use of sterling. However, by the late 1950s, the lack of competitiveness of Britain’s industrial base (particularly “via” Europe) now meant that the international use of sterling could quickly turn from an asset to a liability. As sterling was made convertible, short-term capital inflows and outflows increased in volatility. In these circumstances, the Bank of England found it increasingly difficult to defend the exchange rate – where the slightest “rumour” could lead to a massive speculation against the pound, destabilising the domestic economy. Although these pressures were seen to exist even as early as 1956 (when sterling was only partially convertible) over the first two days of Britain’s invasion of Egypt there was a massive outflow of $50 million – (they became more acute over the next 20 years). From the early 1960s, the “British economy” was dominated by a pattern which saw rising levels of imports, falling exports, and when the balance of payments surplus diminished the introduction of high interest rates to attract short-term capital (hot money) to London.
On entering office in 1964, Wilson found that convertibility and the establishment of the Euro-dollar markets had produced a situation whereby financial markets could validate or disapprove of policy measures within hours. In many ways, the story of the Wilson’s government is one of speculative action against the pound followed by international rescue operations to shore up the sterling exchange rate. Deflationary measures pursued throughout 1965, and 1966 failed to stem the tide of speculation, forcing the government to devalue in November 1967 and to negotiate a $1,5 billion standby credit from the IMF. Wilson agreed with the Bank of England and the Treasury that devaluation was a strategy to be avoided unless the Labour Government was willing to destroy confidence in sterling and the City as the premier financial centre.
So relatively, the development of the Euro-dollar market coincided with the recoveries of the capitalist economies and the growing pressure of the US economy. The shortage of dollars gradually changed into dollar saturation. This market took over aspects of a developed domestic credit system, which was operating globally and independently from the central banks. Speculative capital assumed the function of national and international institutions, financing budget and balance of payments deficits. Such “money” existed as a claim on central bank money in national states on unregulated financial markets. The global role of the City foresaw the result as the dominance of financial over industrial capital. To the sense that although Britain was a low-wage and low-productivity country, it was a centre of global finance (due to the contribution of the Euro-dollar market). However, this did not mean that British industry had been undermined as a consequence of financial interests and policies favouring the concerns of financial markets, although the global role of the City “has had” a detrimental effect on British industrial development. Rather, the development of London as the centre for the global circulation of capital expressed the organisation of “British” capital at the most developed level of global capitalist relations. However, this development of the dominance of financial capital over productive capital must be treated with caution, since it was high interest rates that attracted money capital to London and the fact that the UK is one of the main countries attracting productive investment (particularly from US-based multinationals).
So what can we learn from the British experience? The British case illustrates that there is nothing simple about the choice between government and the market: both are flawed mechanisms in terms of maximising efficiency and both require a deeply rooted underlying consent about their manner of operation and acceptance of their distributional outcomes. Lever later acknowledged in 1974/75 that, “modern governments, overestimated their ability to shape and manage the complex drives of a mature economy. They wrongly assumed that they understood all the reasons for its shortcomings and so, not surprisingly, were all too ready to lay hands on superficial remedies for overcoming them. And all this without any attempt to understand the economies of an increasingly interdependent world” .
It remains to be said that that the nation-state provides the domestic political underpinning for the stability of global capitalist relations. Therefore in order to maintain the position of a nation state’s integration into the “world market” nation states are under constant pressure to make more efficient use of available resources. Failure to achieve this will result in a loss of reserves, precipitated by balance of payments difficulties, and inflationary pressure, provoking global exchange instability and financial crisis.
ENDNOTE
* Here are two very similar definitions of the term Euro-dollars:
Robert Gilpin, (The Political Economy of International Relations, Princetown University Press, 1987, p. 314-315), states that: The Euro-dollar market received its name from American dollars on deposit in European (especially in London) banks yet remaining outside the domestic monetary system, and the stringent control of national monetary authorities.
Enzig and Quinn (The Euro-dollar System: practice and theory of international interest rates, MacMillan Press, 6th edition, 1977, p. 1) state that: the Euro-dollar system is a term used to describe the market in dollar deposits and credits which exists outside the United States of America.
FCO 59/212: Economie Affairs (External), International Monetary Matters, Euro-dollar Market, (1/11/1967-8 /5/1968) (Foreign Office – Economic Relations Department), File Number: UE 4/44
Marx Karl, Contribution to the Critique of Hegel’s Philosophy of Law, in Marx/Engels 1975, vol: 3, p32.
E. Wayne Clendenning, Euro-dollars: The problem of control, The Banker, April 1968
PRO file FCO 59/212: Economie Affairs (External), International Monetary Matters, Euro-dollar Market (Jan 1967- December 1967)
PRO File IR/40/17474: Memo from J.G. Littler to Mr. Andren on foreign currency Borrowing by local authorities, 31 March 1969.
PRO File IR/40/17474: Confidential letter, from Mr. J.G. Littler to Mr. Andren titled foreign currency borrowing by local authorities, 14 March 1969.
PRO File IR/40/17474: Confidential letter from G.B.N. Hartog to Mr Elliston, titled Finance Bill: Eurobond issues by local authorities, 31 March 1969.
T 308/11: Use of “Windfall” Dollars To (A) Improve UK Balance of Payments Position (B) Reduce UK Dollar Indebtedness, (December 1960)
T 236/6260: IBRD- Placing of Dollars Funds in London, 18th August 1960
PRO File T 230/1056: UK submission to working party No. 3 of OECD Economic Policy Committee 1969 (28/01/69 – 11/11/69). File Number: 2EAS 549/188/02
PRO File T 230/1056: UK submission to working party No. 3 of OECD Economic Policy Committee 1969 (28/01/69 – 11/11/69). File Number: 2EAS 549/188/02
Burgess S and Edwards G, The Six plus One, International Affairs, no: 64, 1988, p407.
Camps M, Britain and the European Community 1955-63, Oxford University Press, Oxford, 1964.
PRO file T234/720, Memorandum titled, What went Wrong? Was prepared by the Treasury, July 1959
Harold Lever, The cabinets of 1964-70 had highly gifted individuals. Why then was so little achieved?, The Listener, 22 November 1984, p24-25.
About the Author
Hitesh Patel is a Civil Servant and a Management of Risk Practitioner. Holder of a MBA (from the University of Keele), postgraduate degrees in International Relations and International Political Economy (Cantab.), and other degrees in Business and Management.
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